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Abstract:   
We analyze the impact of globalization on individual gains from trade in a general 
equilibrium model of monopolistic competition featuring product diversity, pro-
competitive effects and income heterogeneity between and within countries. We show 
that, although trade reduces markups in both countries, its impact on variety depends on 
their relative position in the world income distribution: product diversity in the lower 
income country always expands, while that in the higher income country may shrink. 
When the latter occurs, the richer consumers in the higher income country may lose 
from trade because the relative importance of variety versus quantity increases with 
income. We illustrate this effect using data on GDP per capita and population for 186 
countries, as well as parameter estimates for domestic income distributions. Our results 
suggest that U.S. trade with countries of similar GDP per capita makes all agents in both 
countries better off, whereas trade with countries having lower GDP per capita may 
adversely affect up to 11% of the U.S. population. 
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1 Introduction
The questions of whether there are gains from trade and how these gains are distributed are
two of the oldest, and most fundamental ones, in international economics. As is well known,
trade alters the distribution of income across some broad `classes' such as workers and the
owners of capital (Jones, 1965). Trade also adversely a®ects the owners of resources that are
speci¯c to import-competing sectors (Jones, 1971). While it is, therefore, possible that trade
hurts particular groups, the fundamental insight advocated by economists is that, under the
assumption of perfect markets, the nation as a whole unambiguously gains. Such gains from
trade at the aggregate level have also been largely con¯rmed under imperfect competition where
product diversity and scale economies matter (Helpman and Krugman, 1985, Ch.9).1
Do these aggregate gains from trade, which theoretically make possible a Pareto-improving
redistribution, constitute a relevant welfare criterion for globalization? The answer is likely to
be negative. Globalization, as Stiglitz (2006, p.63) puts it, \only promises that the country
as a whole will bene¯t. Theory predicts that there will be losers. In principle, the winners
could compensate the losers; in practice, this almost never happens." Given that compensation
mechanisms are unlikely to be operational, gains from trade should be assessed at the individual
level. The relevant criterion is then whether aggregating individual preferences for trade, not
aggregating individual gains, leads to globalization. The answer clearly depends on the fraction
of agents who gain from trade, irrespective of the magnitude of aggregate gains.
We explore the impact of globalization on individual gains from trade in a general equilib-
rium model of monopolistic competition building on Behrens and Murata (2007). There are two
crucial ingredients in the model. First, we consider that workers are heterogeneous in terms of
labor e±ciency and, therefore, in terms of income, both between and within countries. Second,
we focus on a variable elasticity of substitution (VES) case because, unlike in the constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) case, the relative importance of variety versus quantity changes
with income. Within such a framework, individual gains from trade can be decomposed into
those due to product diversity and those due to pro-competitive e®ects. In order to focus en-
tirely on these two aspects, we abstract from comparative advantage and income distribution
across factors by considering a setting with a single production factor.
Our main results may be summarized as follows. First, in the presence of income hetero-
geneity between countries, the impact of trade on variety depends on their relative position in
the world income distribution. In the lower income country, product diversity in consumption
always expands, whereas it may shrink in the higher income country. Second, trade always
reduces markups in both countries.2 Consequently, all individuals in the lower income country
1Helpman and Krugman (1985) derive the general result that there are gains from trade: (i) when free trade
income and prices enable the economy to purchase autarky aggregate consumption quantities; and (ii) when
switching from autarky to free trade expands product diversity in consumption.
2This is true even when there is a variety loss in the higher income country because globalization has two
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always gain from trade because of lower markups and greater product diversity in consumption.
Turning to the higher income country, two cases may arise. First, when its trading partner
has su±ciently similar average income, the range of varieties expands and markups fall, thus
bene¯ting all consumers. Second, when its trading partner has su±ciently lower average in-
come, the range of varieties shrinks, while markups fall. In the latter case, whether individuals
in the higher income country gain or not depends on their position in the domestic income
distribution.
We show that it is the richer consumers in the higher income country who may lose from
trade because the relative importance of variety versus quantity increases with income. The
intuition is that since utility is bounded for each variety in our framework, the richer consumers
bene¯t only little from increased quantity due to a fall in the price-wage ratios, whereas a
decrease in product diversity hurts them. On the contrary, lower income consumers care less
about variety but more about quantity, and they gain from trade even when facing less product
diversity because the lower price-wage ratios allow them to consume more of each variety. Our
result thus suggests that measured income inequality under a trade regime may overstate `real'
inequality, as the former neglects the di®erent trade-o®s between variety and quantity faced
by high and low income consumers. This is reminiscent of recent work by Broda and Romalis
(2009), who show that much of the rise in measured U.S. income inequality is o®set by a relative
decline in the prices of products that low income consumers buy.
We ¯nally illustrate how many individuals in the higher income country are likely to lose
from trade. Using data on GDP per capita and population for 186 countries, as well as param-
eter estimates for domestic income distributions, we show that U.S. intra-industry trade with
countries of similar GDP per capita makes all agents in both countries better o®, whereas U.S.
intra-industry trade with countries having lower GDP per capita may adversely a®ect up to
11% of the U.S. population.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie°y reviews the related lit-
erature. Section 3 presents the model and derives the equilibrium conditions. Section 4 focuses
on the case of homogeneous populations within each country. This allows to build intuition
for a more general case of heterogeneous populations between and within countries. Section 5
analyzes the general case and provides some numerical illustrations. Section 6 concludes.
opposite e®ects on markups. First, the variety loss under free trade reduces competition, thus raising markups.
Second, ¯rms in the higher income country face lower average income under free trade than in autarky, which
makes demand more elastic, thus reducing markups. The latter e®ect always dominates the former in our
framework, so that markups fall when switching from autarky to trade.
3One may think of relatively new OECD member countries. Indeed, recent work by the OECD (2002,
p.161) classi¯es Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Mexico, Hungary and Germany, the United States, Poland
as countries with \high and increasing intra-industry trade". This suggests that the set of countries with high
intra-industry trade is becoming more dissimilar in terms of GDP per capita.
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2 Related literature
Recent empirical research in international trade has substantiated the importance of product
diversity and pro-competitive e®ects. Using extremely disaggregated data, Broda andWeinstein
(2006) document that the number of U.S. import varieties rose by 212% between 1972 and 2001,
which maps into U.S. welfare gains of about 2:6%. Badinger (2007) ¯nds solid evidence that the
Single Market Programme of the EU has reduced markups by 26% in aggregate manufacturing
of 10 member states. See also Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994) and Tybout (2003) for earlier
empirical evidence on pro-competitive e®ects of international trade.
Despite such empirical evidence, theoretical research has not explored how individual wel-
fare is a®ected by the relative importance of product diversity and pro-competitive e®ects.
Instead, the seminal work by Mayer (1984), for instance, analyzes how the di®erence in capital
endowments across individuals maps into individual preferences for trade openness via changes
in factor prices as implied by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. This prediction under perfect
competition has been recently examined and con¯rmed by using individual survey data (e.g.,
Balistreri, 1997; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Hamilton, 2004; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005).
On the contrary, the monopolistic competition literature focuses either or both on prod-
uct diversity and pro-competitive e®ects, without taking into account income heterogeneity
(Krugman 1979, 1980). One notable exception is Krugman (1981) who considers a two-factor
two-sector monopolistic competition model without intersectoral factor mobility. Since coun-
tries di®er in relative factor endowments, not only product diversity but also factor prices
determine whether each factor gains or not. However, there is no income heterogeneity within
each factor and pro-competitive e®ects do not arise due to the constant elasticity speci¯cation.
In this paper, we show that when income heterogeneity and variable demand elasticity
are jointly taken into account, trade may reduce product diversity in consumption.4 This has
important welfare implications because individual gains from trade depend on product diversity
and pro-competitive e®ects. Saint-Paul (2006) also uses a variable elasticity model and analyzes
the impact of globalization on wages when the total mass of ¯rms is exogenously given and
when there is no income heterogeneity within each country. Since our model allows for free
entry and exit and income heterogeneity both between and within countries, we can analyze
more precisely how the relative importance of variety and quantity a®ects individual welfare.
Finally, Flam and Helpman (1987) and Stokey (1991) consider the relative importance of
quality and quantity. Although this literature on vertical product di®erentiation essentially
deals with the patterns of consumption and specialization, we investigate the impact of trade
on individual welfare in the presence of income heterogeneity between and within countries.
The related paper by Matsuyama (2000) puts more emphasis on demand complementarities
and multisectoral issues under perfect competition, whereas we focus on individual gains from
4Note that this possibility arises even when the number of import varieties increases because the number of
domestic varieties decreases when switching from autarky to trade.
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trade through product diversity and pro-competitive e®ects under monopolistic competition.
3 Model
Consider a world with two countries, labeled r = H;F . Variables associated with each country
will be subscripted accordingly.5 Each country is endowed with a mass Lr of population. Let
L ´ LH +LF denote the world population, and let µ ´ LH=L stand for the population share of
country H. We assume that labor is the only factor of production and that it is internationally
immobile. Furthermore, the labor e±ciency may di®er both between and within countries.
We denote by Gr the cumulative distribution function and by gr the density function of labor
e±ciency in country r. Both are assumed to be continuously di®erentiable, with support
[0;1). An individual with labor e±ciency hr supplies inelastically that many units of labor.
The aggregate labor supply in country r is then given by Lrhr, where hr ´
R
hrdGr(hr) is the
average labor e±ciency in that country.
3.1 Preferences
There is a single monopolistically competitive industry producing a continuum of varieties of
a horizontally di®erentiated consumption good. Let ­r denote the set of varieties produced
in country r, with measure nr. Hence, N ´ nr + ns stands for the endogenously determined
mass of varieties in the global economy. Following Behrens and Murata (2007), we assume that
preferences are additively separable over varieties and that the subutility functions are of the
`constant absolute risk aversion' (CARA) type:
max Ur ´
Z
­r
£
1¡ e¡®qrr(i)¤ di+ Z
­s
£
1¡ e¡®qsr(j)¤ dj
s:t:
Z
­r
pr(i)qrr(i)di+
Z
­s
ps(j)qsr(j)dj = Er(hr);
where pr(i) and ps(j) stand for the prices of varieties i and j produced in countries r and s;
6
qrr(i) and qsr(j) stand for the consumption of domestic and foreign varieties in country r;
Er(hr) stands for expenditure; and ® > 0 is a parameter. The individual with labor e±ciency
hr spends Er(hr) ´ wrhr + ¦=L, where wr stands for the wage rate in country r and ¦=L
stands for the identical claim to aggregate pro¯ts across individuals.7
5To reduce the notational burden, we present a two-country version of the model. However, the model can
be extended to an arbitrary number of countries without qualitatively a®ecting our results.
6We assume that there are no impediments to trade and that product markets are integrated, i.e., ¯rms
cannot price discriminate across markets. This explains why there is only a single subscript for prices.
7Since our focus is not on the sources of income heterogeneity, we assume that it is solely driven by the
di®erence in labor e±ciency, not by the di®erence in pro¯t claims. The assumption of equal pro¯t claims entails
no loss of generality as each ¯rm is negligible and earns zero pro¯t in equilibrium under free entry and exit.
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As shown in Appendix A, the demand functions in country r at an interior solution are
given as follows:
qrr(i; hr) =
Er(hr)
P
¡ 1
®P
½Z
­r
ln
·
pr(i)
pr(j)
¸
pr(j)dj +
Z
­s
ln
·
pr(i)
ps(j)
¸
ps(j)dj
¾
; (1)
qsr(j; hr) =
Er(hr)
P
¡ 1
®P
½Z
­r
ln
·
ps(j)
pr(i)
¸
pr(i)di +
Z
­s
ln
·
ps(j)
ps(i)
¸
ps(i)di
¾
; (2)
where P ´ R
­r
pr(k)dk +
R
­s
ps(k)dk. Because marginal utility at zero consumption is ¯nite,
demands need not be strictly positive in equilibrium. In Section 3.3.2, we derive a su±cient
condition for the price equilibrium to be symmetric, which then makes sure that (1) and (2)
hold since the solution will be interior.
Finally, because of the continuum assumption, changes in an individual price have no impact
on the price aggregates, so that the own-price derivatives are as follows:
@qrr(i; hr)
@pr(i)
= ¡ 1
®pr(i)
and
@qsr(j; hr)
@ps(j)
= ¡ 1
®ps(j)
: (3)
3.2 Technology
All ¯rms have access to the same increasing returns to scale technology. To produce Q(i) units
of any variety requires cQ(i) + f units of labor, where c and f denote the marginal and the
¯xed labor requirements, respectively. We assume that ¯rms can costlessly di®erentiate their
products and that there are no scope economies. Thus, there is a one-to-one correspondence
between ¯rms and varieties, so that the mass of varieties N also stands for the mass of ¯rms
operating in the global economy. There is free entry and exit in each country, which implies
that nr and ns are endogenously determined by the zero pro¯t conditions. The pro¯t of ¯rm i
in country r is given by:
¦r(i) = [pr(i)¡ cwr]Qr(i)¡ fwr; (4)
where Qr(i) ´ Lr
R
qrr(i; hr)dGr(hr) + Ls
R
qrs(i; hs)dGs(hs) stands for its output.
3.3 Equilibrium
3.3.1 De¯nition
Each ¯rm in country r maximizes its pro¯t (4) with respect to pr(i), taking the couples (nH ; nF )
and (wH ; wF ) of ¯rm distributions and factor prices as given. Rearranging terms, the ¯rst-order
conditions can be expressed as follows:
@¦r(i)
@pr(i)
= Qr(i)¡ L [pr(i)¡ cwr]
®pr(i)
= 0: (5)
Expression (5) highlights a fundamental property of monopolistic competition: although each
¯rm is negligible to the market, it must take into account the pricing decisions of the other
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¯rms since the price aggregates a®ect its ¯rst-order condition. A price equilibrium is a price
distribution satisfying condition (5) for all ¯rms in countries H and F . An equilibrium is a
price equilibrium and couples (nH ; nF ) and (wH ; wF ) of a ¯rm distribution and factor prices
such that national factor markets clear, trade is balanced, and ¯rms earn zero pro¯ts. Formally,
an equilibrium is a solution to the following three conditions:Z
­H
£
cQH(i) + f
¤
di = LH
Z
hHdGH(hH); (6)Z
­F
£
cQF (j) + f
¤
dj = LF
Z
hFdGF (hF ); (7)
LH
Z Z
­F
pF (j)qFH(j; hH)djdGH(hH) = LF
Z Z
­H
pH(i)qHF (i; hF )didGF (hF ); (8)
where all quantities are evaluated at a price equilibrium. One may set either wH or wF as
the numeraire. However, we need not do so since the model is fully determined in real terms.8
Finally, it can be readily veri¯ed that ¯rms earn zero pro¯ts when conditions (6){(8) hold.
Hence, aggregate pro¯ts are zero and the expenditure of an individual with labor e±ciency hr
is solely given by wage income: Er(hr) = wrhr.
3.3.2 Properties
In general equilibrium models of imperfect competition, the existence, the uniqueness, and
the properties of the price equilibria are usually di±cult to establish. The reason is that when
¯rms have an in°uence on market aggregates, reaction functions can be badly behaved (Roberts
and Sonnenschein, 1977). This problem does not occur in continuum models of monopolistic
competition because ¯rms have no in°uence on market aggregates.9 However, two additional
questions arise in our open economy model with income heterogeneity and ¯nite marginal utility
at zero consumption: (i) under which conditions the price equilibrium is symmetric; and (ii)
under which conditions product and factor prices are equalized under free trade. Note that the
answers to these questions are not trivial. Indeed, some ¯rms may ¯nd it pro¯table to deviate
from symmetric pricing by charging higher prices to higher income consumers while excluding
lower income consumers. Furthermore, ¯rms sell di®erentiated varieties, so that product price
equalization (PPE) and factor price equalization (FPE) need not hold under free trade, even if
many studies assume, rather than prove, that this is the case.
In what follows, we ¯rst show that free trade leads to both PPE and FPE provided each
individual consumes all varieties. We then derive a su±cient condition for this to hold.
8The choice of the numeraire is immaterial in our monopolistic competition framework. This is an important
departure from general equilibrium oligopoly models, where the choice of the numeraire is not always neutral
(Gabszewicz and Vial, 1972).
9In a similar spirit, to ensure the existence of a general equilibrium under oligopolistic competition, Neary
(2003) considers a model with a continuum of sectors, in which ¯rms are large in their own sector but negligible
in the whole economy.
7
Proposition 1 Assume that each individual consumes all varieties. Then, free trade leads to
product and factor price equalization. Furthermore, the product price is uniquely given by
p = cw +
®E
N
where E ´ µ
Z
EH(hH)dGH(hH) + (1¡ µ)
Z
EF (hF )dGF (hF ): (9)
Proof. See Appendix B.
As can be seen from (9), there are pro-competitive e®ects, i.e., the pro¯t-maximizing price
is decreasing in the mass of competing ¯rms. Furthermore, it is increasing in the average
expenditure E.10 Since FPE implies that E = wh, where h ´ µhH + (1 ¡ µ)hF denotes the
world average labor e±ciency, the product price can be rewritten as
p =
µ
1 +
®h
cN
¶
cw: (10)
So far, we have assumed that each individual consumes all varieties. However, in the presence
of income heterogeneity and ¯nite marginal utility at zero consumption, some ¯rms may ¯nd
it pro¯table to deviate from the symmetric price by charging higher prices to higher income
consumers while excluding lower income consumers. We now derive a su±cient condition under
which there is no such incentive to unilaterally deviate from (9).
Proposition 2 Let ep stand for the price charged by a ¯rm which is unilaterally deviating from
the symmetric price (9). A su±cient condition for (9) to be a price equilibrium, i.e., for such
a unilateral deviation to be unpro¯table, is that
µ
R1
hl(ep)hH dGH(hH) + (1¡ µ) R1hl(ep)hF dGF (hF )
µ
R1
hl(ep) dGH(hH) + (1¡ µ) R1hl(ep) dGF (hF ) · hl(ep) + h+ c®U(hl(ep)); 8ep > p; (11)
where
hl(ep) ´ max½0; Np
®w
ln
µep
p
¶¾
: (12)
is the labor e±ciency of the marginal consumer.
Proof. See Appendix C.
We assume that the su±cient condition (11), which states that the average income of those
who consume the variety must not rise too fast, holds throughout the paper. Note that it is
never pro¯table to deviate from the symmetric price by charging lower prices (ep < p) because
such a deviation does not a®ect the mass of consumers with positive demand, as can be seen
10Using \0/1 preferences", Foellmi et al. (2008) also obtain a similar product price when labor e±ciency
di®ers between countries but population sizes are the same. Note, however, that our product price depends
both on income heterogeneity and on population shares. By contrast, the product price in Foellmi et al. (2008)
includes trade costs. See Behrens et al. (2009) for how trade costs a®ect the product price in the CARA
speci¯cation with heterogeneous ¯rms.
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from (12). In that case, p, as given by (9), is the unique pro¯t-maximizing price. Note ¯nally
that FPE is compatible with income heterogeneity between and within countries because of the
di®erence in labor e±ciency. Hence, without loss of generality, we can restrict ourselves to the
case in which FPE holds since our aim is to analyze the impact of trade on individual welfare
in the presence of income heterogeneity, with less emphasis on the sources of this heterogeneity.
4 Homogeneous populations within each country
We ¯rst present the simple case in which all individuals within each country have the same
labor e±ciency. Without loss of generality, we assume that the labor e±ciency in country H is
higher than or equal to that in country F , i.e., hH ¸ hF .
4.1 Autarky
Assume that country r is in autarky (formally, ­s = ; and Ls = 0). As shown by Behrens and
Murata (2007), the price equilibrium without income heterogeneity is symmetric, which allows
to alleviate notation by dropping the variety index i. Inserting (1) into (5), and letting qrs = 0,
the unique price equilibrium is given by:
par =
µ
1 +
®hr
cnar
¶
cwar ; (13)
where an a-superscript denotes autarky values. Note that (13) is a special case of the symmetric
price equilibrium (10).
The symmetric price equilibrium implies that the budget constraint can then be rewritten as
qar = (w
a
rhr)=(n
a
rp
a
r), which, when inserted into the labor market clearing condition (6), yields:
nar =
Lrhr
f
µ
1¡ cw
a
r
par
¶
: (14)
Expressions (13) and (14) allow us to solve for the equilibrium mass of ¯rms as follows:11
nar = hrD(Lr) where D(Lr) ´
p
4®cfLr + (®f)2 ¡ ®f
2cf
> 0: (15)
It is readily veri¯ed that nar is increasing in hr for any given value of Lrhr. Put di®erently, in
autarky, a higher average labor e±ciency hr maps into greater product diversity for any given
aggregate labor supply Lrhr. The intuition is that an increase in hr makes demands less elastic,
because consumers are richer and thus less price sensitive. As can be seen from (13), this raises
markups, thus leading to entry and to the production of more varieties.
11Note that the other root is negative and must, therefore, be ruled out.
9
4.2 Free trade
We now analyze the impact of globalization on welfare when populations are homogeneous
within each country. To do so, we ¯rst restate the su±cient condition for the symmetric price
equilibrium (11) and derive the equilibrium under free trade. As shown in Appendix C, a
unilateral deviation is possibly pro¯table only when the ¯rm can a®ect the marginal consumer.
Since the density function has a point-mass at hr when populations are homogeneous within
each country, the mass of individuals with positive demand changes at hF and hH . Because
hF · hH by assumption, three cases may arise: (i) hl(ep) 2 (0; hF ), where all consumers
have positive demand; (ii) hl(ep) 2 [hF ; hH), where only consumers in country H have positive
demand; and (iii) hl(ep) 2 [hH ;1), where no consumer has positive demand.
Obviously, there is no incentive for the ¯rm to deviate from the symmetric price p to the
prices corresponding to cases (i) and (iii). This is because the deviating ¯rm cannot change
the mass of consumers it faces in case (i), whereas in case (iii) it faces zero demand. In what
follows, we thus focus on case (ii).12 Because the demand functions are di®erentiable with
respect to ep when hl(ep) 2 [hF ; hH), the su±cient condition for a symmetric price equilibrium
given in Proposition 2 can be rewritten as:
hH · hl(ep) + h+ c
®
U(hl(ep)) 8ep such that hl(ep) 2 [hF ; hH): (16)
When condition (16) holds, which we previously assumed to be the case, Proposition 1 implies
that the price equilibrium is symmetric and given by (10). Because prices and wages are
equalized, all ¯rms sell the same quantity Q = (LHhH +LFhF )(w=Np). Labor market clearing
then implies that nH=nF = (LHhH)=(LFhF ), which yields
nr =
Lrhr
f
µ
1¡ cw
p
¶
; (17)
Inserting (10) into (17), and doing the same with the analogous expressions for s 6= r, we
obtain two equations with two unknowns nH and nF (recall that N ´ nH + nF ). Solving for
the equilibrium masses of ¯rms, we readily obtain
nH = µhHD(L) and nF = (1¡ µ)hFD(L):
The equilibrium mass of ¯rms in the global economy is then given by
N ´ nH + nF = hD(L): (18)
Comparing expressions (14) and (17), we see that nr < n
a
r if and only if the free trade price-
wage ratio is smaller than the autarky price-wage ratio. We show that this is always the
case, as in Krugman (1979) and Feenstra (2004). Interestingly, unlike in the existing literature
without income heterogeneity between countries, we further show that product diversity in
12Note that case (ii) does not arise when hF = hH so that the price equilibrium is symmetric.
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consumption may not expand for all individuals when switching from autarky to trade. The
following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 3 Assume that the labor e±ciency in country H is greater than or equal to that
in country F , i.e., hH ¸ hF . When compared with autarky, we show that under free trade: (i)
the mass of varieties consumed in country H decreases if and only if
hHD(LH) > hD(L); (19)
whereas that in country F always increases; (ii) the mass of varieties produced in each country
decreases; and (iii) the price-wage ratio falls in each country.
Proof. Since by assumption hF · h · hH and maxfLH ; LFg < L, expressions (15) and (18)
reveal that N > naF , whereas N T naH if and only if hHD(LH) S hD(L), which establishes (i).
Comparing (10) and (13) establishes (iii) because (15) and (18) imply hr=n
a
r > h=N for r =
H;F . By (14) and (17), this implies that nr < n
a
r for r = H;F , thus proving (ii).
It is worth noting that variable elasticity and income heterogeneity between countries are crucial
for our results. Baldwin and Forslid (2006) and Arkolakis et al. (2008) obtain a similar variety
loss in CES models with ¯rm heterogeneity. However, welfare implications of our variety loss are
quite di®erent from theirs. As we show in Section 5, welfare decreases for a subset of consumers
in our model because, unlike in their CES models, the relative importance of variety versus
quantity changes with income. On the contrary, Baldwin and Forslid (2006) and Arkolakis et
al. (2008) show that welfare rises even when there is a variety loss.
Some comments are in order. First, one may ask whether there always exists hH satisfying
both (16) and (19). To check this, note that the su±cient condition (16) is satis¯ed when
1 · hH
hF
· 2¡ µ
1¡ µ ´ ©(µ);
where we use the more stringent condition hH · hF + h < hl(ep) + h + (c=®)U(hl(ep)) for all ep
such that hl(ep) 2 [hF ; hH). Expression (19), in turn, requires that
hH
hF
>
(1¡ µ)D(L)
D(µL)¡ µD(L) ´ ª(µ):
Noting that limµ!0©(µ) = 2, limµ!1©(µ) = 1, limµ!0ª(µ) = 1, limµ!1ª(µ) = 2 + [® +
cD(L)]f=cL, and that © is increasing whereas ª is decreasing in µ 2 [0; 1], © and ª cross only
once for µ 2 [0; 1].13 Based on these observations, the four possible cases are summarized in
Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
13Note that ª is decreasing in µ 2 [0; 1] because ª is convex and limµ!1ª0(µ) < 0.
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Case (I) in Figure 1 shows that when hH=hF is su±ciently small, no ¯rm wants to deviate, and
hence, PPE and FPE hold. Furthermore, product diversity expands in both countries under
free trade irrespective of the value of µ. More interestingly, case (II) shows that there exists
couples (µ; hH=hF ) such that no ¯rm wants to deviate, and hence, PPE and FPE hold; whereas
product diversity in consumption shrinks in the higher income country when switching from
autarky to trade. This may make consumers in the higher income country worse o®, depending
on the relative importance of product diversity and pro-competitive e®ects. In cases (III) and
(IV), when hH=hF is large enough, the su±cient condition for no deviation is not satis¯ed and
hence PPE and FPE may not hold. Hence, the results on whether product diversity expands
or not should be interpreted cautiously in these cases.
Second, Proposition 3 illustrates exit of ¯rms due to the pro-competitive e®ects of interna-
tional trade. As can be seen from the equilibrium price-wage ratios
par
war
= c+
®
D(Lr)
and
p
w
= c+
®
D(L)
; (20)
the equilibrium markups in both countries decrease under free trade, thus driving some ¯rms
out of each national market.14 Labor market clearing then implies that ¯rm-level and total
production expands, as labor is reallocated from the ¯xed requirements of closing ¯rms to
the marginal requirements of surviving ¯rms. Contrary to the growing literature on ¯rm het-
erogeneity in international trade (e.g., Melitz, 2003), where the price-cost margin is usually
constant because of the CES speci¯cation, our model captures the `old idea' that international
trade reduces markups and hence triggers exit of ¯rms even without ¯rm heterogeneity.15
Last, one can readily veri¯ed that
@nr
@Lr
> 0;
@ns
@Lr
< 0;
@nr
@hr
> 0 and
@ns
@hr
= 0 for r 6= s:
Interestingly, an increase in population in country r reduces the mass of ¯rms in country s,
whereas an increase in average labor e±ciency has no such impact. This is because there are
both direct and indirect e®ects, as can be seen from (17). First, increases in population and
average labor e±ciency directly raise the domestic aggregate labor supply, thus increasing the
mass of domestic ¯rms. Second, an increase in population in country r has a negative e®ect on
the equilibrium markups (20) and, therefore, reduces indirectly the equilibrium mass of ¯rms in
14In Lawrence and Spiller (1983, Proposition 7), trade leads to a redistribution of ¯rms between the two
countries while the total mass of ¯rms remains unchanged. This result is driven by changes in relative factor
prices and, as pointed out by the authors, need not hold under variable markups. Furthermore, they show in
Proposition 5 that the price of the monopolistically competitive good falls in one country and rises in the other
due to changes in relative factor prices. Yet, the markups remain constant because of the CES speci¯cation.
15One notable exception is Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) who recently proposed a model that explains trade-
induced exit by combining pro-competitive e®ects and ¯rm heterogeneity in a monopolistic competition frame-
work. However, due to their quasi-linear speci¯cation, there is no point in introducing income heterogeneity in
their model as higher income consumers would spend their additional income only on the numeraire good.
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both countries, whereas an increase in average labor e±ciency has no impact on the equilibrium
markups.
4.3 Welfare decomposition and gains from trade
We analyze gains from trade by decomposing welfare changes into those due to product diversity
and those due to pro-competitive e®ects. Since the price equilibrium is symmetric under both
autarky and free trade, we have qa = (warhr)=(n
a
rp
a
r) and q = (whr)=(Np). The utility di®erence
between free trade and autarky in country r = H;F can then be expressed as follows:
¢Ur(hr) ´ Ur(hr)¡ Uar (hr) = N
³
1¡ e¡®whrNp
´
¡ nar
µ
1¡ e¡
®warhr
narp
a
r
¶
:
Adding and subtracting nare
¡®whr=(narp) and rearranging, we obtain the following decomposition:
¢Ur(hr) ´ N
³
1¡ e¡®whrNp
´
¡ nar
³
1¡ e¡®whrnarp
´
| {z }
Product diversity
+nar
³
e
¡®w
a
rhr
narp
a
r ¡ e¡®whrnarp
´
| {z }
Pro-competitive e®ects
; (21)
which isolates the two channels, namely product diversity and pro-competitive e®ects, through
which gains from trade materialize. The former captures welfare changes through product
diversity given the wage-price ratio under free trade w=p, whereas the latter captures welfare
changes through the wage-price ratio given product diversity under autarky nar .
Using the results of Proposition 3 and the welfare decomposition (21), we ¯rst consider the
benchmark case in which populations are homogeneous even between countries. Noting that
expression (19) never holds when hH = hF , we can show the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume that the two countries have the same average labor e±ciency, i.e.,
hH = hF = h. Then, free trade raises welfare through greater product diversity in consumption
and through lower price-wage ratios.
Proof. Proposition 3 shows that when hH = hF = h, trade always expands product diversity
in consumption, which raises welfare via `love-of-variety' as follows. Given the price-wage
ratio under free trade, we have Ur = N [1 ¡ e¡®wh=(Np)] and @Ur=@N = 1 ¡ e¡®wh=(Np)[1 +
®wh=(Np)] > 0 for all N and r = H;F . To obtain the last inequality, let z ´ ®wh=(Np) and
»(z) ´ 1 ¡ e¡z(1 + z). Clearly, »(0) = 0 and »0(z) > 0 for all z > 0, which shows that for
any given price-wage ratio under free trade, utility increases in the mass of varieties consumed.
Hence, the ¯rst term in (21) is positive. Similarly, by Proposition 3, we know that for any given
mass of ¯rms under autarky, the price-wage ratio falls under free trade, thus implying that the
second term in (21) is also positive.
On the contrary, the mass of varieties consumed in country H may decrease when hH > hF ,
as can be seen from Proposition 3. More speci¯cally, when µ and hH=hF belong to (II) in
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Figure 1, the ¯rst term in (21) is no longer positive. When this occurs, there may be losses from
trade in the higher income country despite a fall in the price-wage ratios. In what follows, we
explore this possibility by analyzing a more general case in which populations are heterogeneous
both between and within countries.
5 Heterogeneous populations between and within coun-
tries
So far, we have shown that whenever there is a variety loss in the presence of income hetero-
geneity between countries, it occurs in the higher income country. We now analyze who in the
higher income country may lose from trade by exploring gains from trade at the individual
level.
5.1 Welfare decomposition and gains from trade
Unlike in the previous section where all individuals in a country are a®ected in the same way
by trade, income heterogeneity within a country matters when assessing who gains and who
loses from trade. This is because trade may have opposite welfare e®ects on consumers in the
higher income country through variety and quantity, and their relative importance changes
with income. As in Section 4.3, welfare changes of an individual with labor e±ciency hr are
measured by ¢Ur(hr), which can now be decomposed as follows:
¢Ur(hr) ´ N
³
1¡ e¡®whrNp
´
¡ nar
³
1¡ e¡®whrnarp
´
| {z }
Product diversity
+nar
³
e
¡®w
a
rhr
narp
a
r ¡ e¡®whrnarp
´
| {z }
Pro-competitive e®ects
: (22)
This expression is analogous to (21) except that it depends on the individual labor e±ciency hr
instead of on the average hr. Since in our model demand functions are linear in expenditure,
the price equilibrium and the equilibrium mass of ¯rms depend only on the average labor
e±ciency. Hence, Proposition 3 carries over to the case of income heterogeneity within each
country. Using (22), we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Assume that country H has a higher average labor e±ciency than country F ,
i.e., hH > h > hF . Then, when (19) holds, there exists a unique threshold h
loss
H in country H
such that ¢UH(hH) T 0 for hH S hlossH . Otherwise, free trade raises the welfare of all consumers
in country H. In country F, free trade always raises the welfare of all consumers.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 5 shows that it is the richer consumers in the higher income country who may lose
from trade, because the relative importance of variety versus quantity increases with income.
The intuition is that since utility is bounded for each variety in our framework, the richer
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consumers bene¯t only little from increased quantity due to a fall in the price-wage ratios,
whereas a decrease in product diversity hurts them. On the contrary, lower income consumers
care less about variety but more about quantity, and they gain from trade even when facing
less product diversity because the lower price-wage ratios allow them to consume more of each
variety. Note that the losses from trade due to income heterogeneity are reminiscent of those in
Epifani and Gancia (2009), who show that markup heterogeneity across sectors causes welfare
losses under restricted entry despite the decline in the average markup. However, welfare always
increases when entry is free in their framework. In our model, losses from trade may exist even
when entry is unrestricted, but only for a subset of consumers because of income heterogeneity.
5.2 Numerical illustration
How many individuals in the higher income country may lose from trade? The answer depends
on the distribution functionsGH andGF , which we have not speci¯ed until now. To measure the
share of individuals who lose from trade, we focus on two-parameter distributions, in particular
Gamma and Lognormal, because these distributions provide reasonably good approximations
of income distributions in many countries.
We illustrate the quantitative e®ects of our model for U.S. consumers. To this end, we
use data on real GDP per capita and population, as well as parameter estimates for the U.S.
income distribution. Our sample consists of 188 countries in 1997 obtained from the Penn
World Table Version 6.2, from which we exclude Angola and Libya as no data on real GDP
per capita is available. The estimates of shape and scale parameters for the U.S. household
income distribution in 1997 are taken from Bandourian et al. (2002). We are not aware of any
recent estimates of these parameters for the U.S. personal income distribution and therefore
make the admittedly strong assumption that the personal and household income distributions
have the same shape. We then approximate the scale parameters of the other countries by
assuming that they are proportional to those of the U.S., with proportionality coe±cient given
by real GDP per capita relative to the U.S. The shape parameters are assumed to be the same
as those of the U.S. While the latter assumption is solely motivated by the lack of data, it is
not very restrictive since the shape parameters of the trading partners matter only for checking
the su±cient condition (11). As it is not generally possible to check the no-deviation condition
analytically, we verify it numerically for the two income distributions to see whether they are
compatible with a symmetric price equilibrium.16 We then check whether product diversity in
consumption decreases, by evaluating condition (19) using the equilibrium values. If there is a
variety loss, we solve for the labor e±ciency of the marginal consumer by equating (22) to zero,
which allows us to compute the mass of losers whose income exceeds the computed threshold.
16To do so, we evaluate (11) for values of hl(ep) ranging from 10 to 100000 with step 10. Results are robust
to di®erent ranges and step sizes.
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Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here.
Figures 2 and 3 depict the relationship between the share of the U.S. population who
lose from trade and real GDP per capita of the trading partners for Gamma and Lognormal
distributions, respectively.17 Note that U.S. intra-industry trade with countries of similar GDP
per capita makes all individuals better o® because it reduces the price-wage ratios and expands
the range of varieties consumed in both countries, as shown in Propositions 3 and 4. However,
U.S. trade with countries having lower GDP per capita may adversely a®ect up to 11% of
the U.S. population. The reason is that although the price-wage ratios decrease, such trade
reduces product diversity in consumption. Note that when the trading partners' GDP per
capita is su±ciently small, condition (11) is violated, thus indicating that our results need to
be interpreted cautiously because PPE and FPE may not hold.
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here.
As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2, for both income distributions, 22 out of the 28 OECD
trading partners in 1997 lead to 0% of losers. For the remaining 6 OECD trading partners
(Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Mexico, and Turkey), the percentage of losers
ranges from about 0% to a maximum of almost 6% for Turkey. In other words, intra-industry
trade between the OECD countries is bene¯cial to a broad mass of consumers. Tables 1 and 2
also show that U.S. trade with countries like China and India may yield a non-negligible share
of losers in the U.S. (from about 12% to about 20%, depending on the distribution functions).
In this numerical illustration, we have so far focused mainly on the share of losers in the U.S.
by assuming that the U.S. actually trades with each trading partner. We can assess whether
the U.S. as a whole is likely to agree on free trade with each potential trading partner. Needless
to say, this requires an assumption on a relevant political process. Although such an analysis
is beyond the scope of this paper, Tables 1 and 2 show that the share of potential losers is
not overwhelming in all cases, thus suggesting that U.S. intra-industry trade even with highly
dissimilar countries need not require protection.18
Insert Figures 4 and 5 and Table 3 about here.
Finally, we illustrate the decomposition of welfare changes at the individual level based
on (22). To do this, we restrict ourselves to the Gamma distribution and focus on Canada
and Mexico as U.S. trading partners. As can been seen from Table 1, there are no losers in
the U.S. from trade with Canada. In the case of Mexico, however, the percentage of losers
17In what follows, we choose the following parameter values: ® = 0:3; c = 0:1; and F = 0:1.
18This can be seen, for example, as follows. Recall our argument in the Introduction that compensation
mechanisms are unlikely to be operational, and consider a simple political process based on majority voting.
Let bhH stand for the median of the distribution GH . Then, comparing hlossH and bhH , we see that free trade is
the social outcome if and only if bhH < hlossH . Clearly, this is always the case in Tables 1 and 2.
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in the U.S. is 1.09 with the threshold hlossH = 173687. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate how product
diversity and pro-competitive e®ects due to trade with Canada and Mexico contribute to welfare
changes for U.S. consumers depending on their income. As expected, the relative importance
of product diversity increases in income in both cases. This can also be seen from Table 3,
which summarizes the welfare changes due to trade with Canada for U.S. consumers at selected
income percentiles.
6 Concluding remarks
Globalization is widely believed to yield gains from trade at the aggregate level, yet produces
winners and losers at the individual level. In this paper, we have analyzed the impact of
globalization on individual gains from trade in a general equilibrium model of monopolistic
competition featuring income heterogeneity between and within countries. We have shown
that, although trade always reduces markups in both countries, its impact on product diversity
in consumption depends on their relative position in the world income distribution. Indeed,
the range of varieties consumed in the lower income country always expands, while that in
the higher income country may shrink. When the latter occurs, it is the richer consumers in
the higher income country who may lose from trade because the relative importance of variety
versus quantity increases with income. We have illustrated the quantitative e®ects of the model
using data on GDP per capita and population for 186 countries, as well as parameter estimates
for domestic income distributions. It turns out that U.S. trade with countries of similar GDP
per capita makes all agents in both countries better o®, whereas trade with countries having
lower GDP per capita may adversely a®ect up to 11% of the U.S. population.
In order to focus entirely on how globalization a®ects individual welfare through product
diversity and pro-competitive e®ects, we have developed a highly stylized model. The following
two points should therefore be kept in mind when interpreting our results. First, to focus
on income heterogeneity, our analysis abstracts from ¯rm heterogeneity and trade costs (see
Behrens et al., 2009, for an application of our CARA speci¯cation to ¯rm heterogeneity and
trade costs). Introducing all these elements into a single framework appears to be a promising
extension in order to get a more complete picture of the impact of globalization on individual
gains from trade.
Second, our analysis assumes that there is a single production factor, which rules out the
role of relative factor prices in determining individual welfare. By contrast, when there is more
than one factor, for instance, skilled and unskilled workers, factor proportions theory generally
predicts that skilled workers in a skill abundant country will gain from trade, whereas the
unskilled in that country will lose from trade. Our results thus suggest that such Stolper-
Samuelson e®ects may get weakened or even reversed when product diversity, pro-competitive
e®ects, and income heterogeneity are taken into account. Ultimately, trade may not generate
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as much inequality in individual welfare than predicted by factor proportions theory.
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Appendix A: Derivation of the demand functions
Letting ¸ stand for the Lagrange multiplier, the ¯rst-order conditions for an interior solution
are given by:
®e¡®qrr(i;hr) = ¸pr(i); 8i 2 ­r (23)
®e¡®qsr(j;hr) = ¸ps(j); 8j 2 ­s (24)
and the budget constraintZ
­r
pr(k)qrr(k; hr)dk +
Z
­s
ps(k)qsr(k; hr)dk = Er(hr): (25)
Taking the ratio of (23) with respect to i and j, we obtain
qrr(i; hr) = qrr(j; hr) +
1
®
ln
·
pr(j)
pr(i)
¸
8i; j 2 ­r:
Multiplying this expression by pr(j) and integrating with respect to j 2 ­r we obtain
qrr(i; hr)
Z
­r
pr(j)dj =
Z
­r
pr(j)qrr(j; hr)dj +
1
®
Z
­r
ln
·
pr(j)
pr(i)
¸
pr(j)dj: (26)
Analogously, taking the ratio of (23) and (24) with respect to i and j, we get:
qrr(i; hr) = qsr(j; hr) +
1
®
ln
·
ps(j)
pr(i)
¸
8i 2 ­r; 8j 2 ­s:
Multiplying this expression by ps(j) and integrating with respect to j 2 ­s we obtain
qrr(i; hr)
Z
­s
ps(j)dj =
Z
­s
ps(j)qsr(j; hr)dj +
1
®
Z
­s
ln
·
ps(j)
pr(i)
¸
ps(j)dj: (27)
Summing expressions (26) and (27), and using the budget constraint (25), we ¯nally obtain the
demands (1). The derivation of the demands (2) is analogous.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
Using (1), (2) and the de¯nition of output per ¯rm, it is readily veri¯ed that
QH(i)¡QF (j) = ¡L
®
ln
·
pH(i)
pF (j)
¸
: (28)
Because each individual is assumed to consume all varieties, the ¯rst-order conditions (5) must
hold for all ¯rms in countries H and F . Using expression (28), one can check that
@¦H(i)
@pH(i)
¡ @¦F (j)
@pF (j)
= 0 () c
·
wH
pH(i)
¡ wF
pF (j)
¸
= ln
·
pH(i)
pF (j)
¸
: (29)
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Furthermore, from expression (4) the zero pro¯t condition requires that
¦r(i)
wr
=
·
pr(i)
wr
¡ c
¸
Qr(i)¡ f = 0 for r = H;F:
Assume that there exists i 2 ­H and j 2 ­F such that pH(i) > pF (j). Then (29) implies
that wH=pH(i) > wF=pF (j) or, equivalently, that pH(i)=wH < pF (j)=wF ; whereas (28) implies
that QH(i) < QF (j). Hence, ¦H(i)=wH < ¦F (j)=wF , which is incompatible with the zero
pro¯t condition at least in one country. We thus conclude that pH(i) = pF (j) must hold for
all i 2 ­H and j 2 ­F , which shows that product prices are equalized. Expression (29) then
shows that wH = wF , i.e., factor prices are equalized whenever product prices are equalized.
Finally, setting pr(i) = ps(j) = p and wr = ws = w in (5) yields expression (9).
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2
We derive a su±cient condition for the symmetric price p, as given by (9), to be a price equilib-
rium in the presence of income heterogeneity and ¯nite marginal utility at zero consumption.19
To alleviate notation, we suppress subscripts whenever there is no possible confusion. Taking
into account the fact that demands need not be strictly positive, aggregate demand is given by
Qr(i) = Lr
R1
0
max f0; qrr(i; hr)g dGr(hr) + Ls
R1
0
max f0; qrs(i; hs)g dGs(hs).
We now examine under which conditions ¯rms have no incentive to unilaterally deviate
from the symmetric price (9) even when individuals are allowed not to consume all varieties.
Assume that one ¯rm charges the price ep, whereas all the other ¯rms charge the price p given
by (9). Since the deviating ¯rm is negligible to the market, wages are una®ected and remain
equalized between the two countries. The labor e±ciency of the marginal consumer must
satisfy qrr(ep; hl(ep)) = qsr(ep; hl(ep)) = 0, which yields (12). Letting eh ´ hl(ep), we can rewrite the
demand function of the deviating ¯rm as follows:
Qr(ep) = Lr Z 1eh qrr(i; hr)dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh qrs(i; hs)dGs(hs): (30)
Di®erentiating (30) with respect to ep and applying the Leibniz integral rule, we get:
Q0r(ep) = Lr Z 1eh @qrr(ep; hr)@ep dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh
@qrs(ep; hs)
@ep dGs(hs); (31)
where we have used the properties qrr(ep;eh) = qrs(ep;eh) = 0. The operating pro¯t of the
deviating ¯rm is given by ¼r(ep) = (ep¡ cw)Qr(ep). Imposing symmetry on prices, on quantities,
and on their derivatives, we then have
qrr(ep; hr) = whr
Np
¡ 1
®
ln
µep
p
¶
;
@qrr(ep; hr)
@ep = ¡ 1®ep (32)
qrs(ep; hs) = whs
Np
¡ 1
®
ln
µep
p
¶
;
@qrs(ep; hs)
@ep = ¡ 1®ep ¢ (33)
19See Saint-Paul (2006) for a similar analysis of this problem in the context of a closed economy.
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Plugging (32) and (33) into (30) and (31), we get
Qr(ep) = w
Np
·
Lr
Z 1
eh hr dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh hs dGs(hs)
¸
¡ 1
®
ln
µep
p
¶·
Lr
Z 1
eh dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh dGs(hs)
¸
Q0r(ep) = ¡ 1®ep
·
Lr
Z 1
eh dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh dGs(hs)
¸
:
We now classify all possible deviations from symmetry into two cases: (i) ep < p and (ii) ep > p.
Case (i): ep < p
From expression (12), we obtain eh = 0. Hence, a unilateral deviation with a lower price is not
pro¯table since for any ep < p we have
@¼r(ep)
@ep = L
·
wh
Np
¡ 1
®
ln
µep
p
¶
¡ ep¡ cw
®ep
¸
> L
·
wh
Np
¡ 1
®
ln
µep
p
¶
¡ p¡ cw
®p
¸
= ¡ 1
®
ln
µep
p
¶
> 0;
where we have used the de¯nition of p in the last step.
Case (ii): ep > p
Given the result in case (i), a su±cient condition for (9) to be a symmetric price equilibrium is
that @¼r(ep)=@ep · 0 for all ep > p. This condition can be expressed as follows:
w
Np
·
Lr
Z 1
eh hr dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh hs dGs(hs)
¸
·
·
1
®
ln
µep
p
¶
+
ep¡ cw
®ep
¸ ·
Lr
Z 1
eh dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh dGs(hs)
¸
for all ep > p. Using (12), and because ep > p, the condition can be rewritten as
Lr
Z 1
eh hr dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh hs dGs(hs) ·
·eh+ Np
®w
µ
1¡ cwep
¶¸·
Lr
Z 1
eh dGr(hr) + Ls
Z 1
eh dGs(hs)
¸
for all ep > p. Since p=ep = e¡®weh=(Np) by (12) we obtain
µ
R1eh hr dGr(hr) + (1¡ µ) R1eh hs dGs(hs)
µ
R1eh dGr(hr) + (1¡ µ) R1eh dGs(hs) · eh+ Np®w ¡ cN® e¡®w
eh
Np ;
where we have used the de¯nition of the population share µ. Using p = [c + (®h=N)]w,
q(p;eh) = weh=(Np) and the expression of the utility function, we ¯nally obtain (11).
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Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 5
The ¯rst part of Proposition 5 can be established as follows. When condition (19) holds, free
trade reduces the mass of varieties consumed in country H, while the price-wage ratio decreases.
Hence, two opposing e®ects are at work and the overall outcome is a priori ambiguous. In
general, it will depend on the value of hH . To see this, we proceed as follows. First, evaluating
(22) at the price equilibrium and at the equilibrium mass of ¯rms, and di®erentiating the
resulting expression with respect to hH , it is veri¯ed that
@ (¢UH(hH))
@hH
=
®N
®h+ cN
exp
µ
¡ ®hH
®h+ cN
¶
¡ ®n
a
H
®hH + cnaH
exp
µ
¡ ®hH
®hH + cnaH
¶
(34)
and that
@ (¢UH(hH))
@hH
¯¯¯
hH=0
> 0 () N
naH
=
[®+ cD(L)]h
[®+ cD(LH)]hH
>
h
hH
; (35)
which always holds. This establishes that ¢UH is positively sloped at hH = 0. Second, note
that the derivative (34) has a unique root, which is given by
hextH =
(®h+ cN)(®hH + cn
a
H)
®[®(hH ¡ h) + c(naH ¡N)]
ln
µ
®hHN + cn
a
HN
®hnaH + cn
a
HN
¶
; (36)
such that hextH > 0 if and only if ®(hH ¡ h) + c (naH ¡N) > 0. Third, since
sgn
"
@2(¢UH(hH))
@h2H
¯¯¯¯
hH=h
ext
H
#
= sgn
©¡ £®(hH ¡ h) + c(naH ¡N)¤ª ; (37)
the associated extremum is: (i) a local maximum when hextH > 0; and (ii) a local minimum
when hextH < 0. We now analyze these two cases.
Case (i): hextH > 0
Two sub-cases may emerge. First, when (19) holds, we have N < naH , which then implies that
limhH!1¢UH(hH) = N ¡ naH < 0. In this case, there exists a unique threshold hlossH such
that ¢UH(hH) T 0 for hH S hlossH , since (35) and ¢UH(0) = 0 hold and ¢UH is continuous
in hH . Second, when (19) does not hold, we have N > n
a
H . In this case, free trade raises the
welfare of all consumers in country H through increased product diversity (N > naH) and lower
price-wage ratios (p=w < paH=w
a
H).
Case (ii): hextH < 0
Since (35) and ¢UH(0) = 0 hold and ¢UH is continuous and strictly increasing for all hH ¸ 0,
all individuals in country H gain from trade.
The second part of Proposition 5 directly result from the expansion of product diversity in
consumption (N > naF ) and the decrease in the price-wage ratios (p=w < p
a
F=w
a
F ).
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Figure 1: Product diversity in country H and no deviation condition
when populations are homogeneous within each country
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Figure 2: Gamma distribution
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Figure 3: Lognormal distribution
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Figure 4: Decomposition of welfare changes due to trade with Canada (Gamma distribution)
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Figure 5: Decomposition of welfare changes due to trade with Mexico (Gamma distribution)
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Table 3: Decomposition of welfare changes due to trade with Canada
(Gamma distribution)
Household income percentiles
10th 20th 50th 80th 90th 95th
Household income in U.S. dollars 10588 17601 42294 81719 112241 144636
Product diversity (%) 6.23 9.17 19.52 31.92 39.18 45.37
Pro-competitive e®ects (%) 93.77 90.83 80.48 68.08 60.82 54.63
Notes: U.S. distribution parameters (shape = 1:503, scale = 31124). Household income in U.S.
dollars is taken from the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey 1997 Annual Social and
Economic Supplements.
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